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Chapter 7
Less than Membership but More than Association: Establishing the European
Economic Area, 1989–1993
Juhana Aunesluoma
The latter 1980s and early 1990s are generally understood as a pivotal moment in the
history of European integration. While the following decades would give rise to a series
of basic treaty revisions to refine the decision-making and power-sharing arrangements
of the European Union (EU), it was in this earlier period that the still European
Community (EC) took the decisive turn towards a more deeply integrated and
geographically expanding bloc. The tremendous speed in which economic integration
had progressed over previous decades, and the further commercial benefits that might
be accrued from creating still wider and deeper markets, provided the necessary
momentum for the Community to agree the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. Its
aim was to create an integrated single market in goods, services, financial capital and
labour by 1992. Popularised as the EC’s four freedoms, this would require the removal
of a large variety of physical, technical and fiscal barriers of cross-border trade and
economic activity.1 As the so-called Project 1992 got underway, debates over adding to
this already ambitious agenda began in earnest. The outcome was a meeting of the
European Council in Maastricht in December 1991, where member states agreed not
only to establish a single currency and work towards the full realisation of an Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) but also to extend and strengthen their cooperation in both
foreign and security policy and home and justice affairs, in what by 1993 would
officially come to be known as the EU. And with it came the additional opportunity for
the Community to open its doors to new members. Three Cold War neutrals – Austria,
Sweden and Finland – would consequently join in 1995, followed by further waves of
enlargement in 2004, 2007 and 2013.2
1 The origins of the SEA and its implementation are covered in Wilfried Loth, Building Europe: A History
of European Unification (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015), 271–89.
2 Ibid., 310–22; Johnny Laursen, ‘The Enlargement of the European Community, 1950–95’, in Wilfried
Loth (ed.), Experiencing Europe: 50 years of European Construction 1957–2007 (Baden-Baden: Nomos,
2009), 269–304; Antonie Marès, ‘Central Europe in the “Fifth” Enlargement of the European Union’, in
Loth (ed.), Experiencing Europe, 326–45; Michael Gehler, ‘A Newcomer Experienced in European
Integration: Austria’, in Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert (eds.), European Union Enlargement. A
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At first sight, this path from the 1980s to the 2000s seems straightforward. This
was seemingly a period that saw a dramatic rise in the comparative political and
economic weight of the EC/EU. Supported by predominantly pro-integration, even
enthusiastic, elites and electorates, the EC/EU and the ideas that underpinned it emerged
as one of the champions of the great systemic and ideological struggles of the twentieth
century. Freed from the geopolitical constraints of the Cold War international system
and riding the tide of liberalisation and growing flows of trade and capital, international
cooperation in Europe came to be dominated by the ‘European project’, a process of
regional integration that had started in the 1950s in continental Western Europe but now
seemed to be spreading throughout the continent. Understood as institutionalised, in
part intergovernmental and in part supranational governance of economic and political
interdependence among sovereign nation states, such was its appeal that ‘integration’
in common parlance became synonymous with both ‘Europe’ and, most explicitly, ‘the
EU’. When it came to economic and political cooperation and its institutionalisation, at
the turn of the millennium, the EU looked like the only game in town.
A closer look of course tells a more complicated story. Later experiences have
shown that developments in the EU fell short of the kind of a fundamental transition of
the state system, collective identities and societal norms towards a post-national
Europe, that many had hoped. The single market, for example, was arguably created
without due concern to the social policy challenges and socio-economic displacement
that the implementation of freedom of movement would cause in the lives of ordinary
citizens. Nor is it unreasonable to suggest that the EMU was built on compromises that
hamstrung its economic policy coordination capacity and made it ill-equipped to face
the consequences of the global financial crisis of 2008. The EU’s enlargement in the
2000s was likewise accompanied with overly optimistic expectations of the ability of
the newcomers to complete their post-socialist or post-conflict transitions and catch up
with prosperous, established liberal democracies of the West. Ambitions to develop the
EU into a new kind of global actor, resting upon ‘normative power’ and a record of
institutional successes and values as the foundation of its international influence, were
contrasted with the weakness of its collective agency in the global military and
geopolitical rivalries of the 2010s.
Comparative History (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 131–49; Hanna Ojanen, ‘If in “Europe”,
then in its “core”?’ Finland’, in ibid., 150–69; Maria Gussarsson, ‘Combining Dependence with Distance:
Sweden’, in ibid., 170–88.
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As the gap between earlier, more optimistic expectations and the realities of the
subsequent decades has widened, scholars have become increasingly interested in the
foundations of the continent’s post-Cold War order. Developments from the 1980s to
the new millennium, when the hegemonic ideas and institutional practices of post-Cold
War European politics and societal conditions took their form, have been studied from
a variety of perspectives.3 In the field of security policy, a vigorous debate has emerged
on the consequences of the decision to expand NATO to include ex-Warsaw Pact
countries and modernize it as the primary vehicle of transatlantic security cooperation.4
One of the major issues that have aroused scholarly interest is the extent to which
there existed alternatives to the ways in which the strategic outlook of EU members
changed and its economic and political integration proceeded after the Cold War.
Without engaging in counterfactual history writing, scholars have been keen to explore
and reconstruct actual decision-making processes and identify possible alternative plans
and competing designs for known historical outcomes. A full understanding of
historical developments requires not only the explanation of how and why certain things
happened but also why other developments did not. We cannot confine ourselves to the
study of only known outcomes; to paraphrase historian A.J.P. Taylor, we also need to
look into historical turning points and when history failed to turn.5
In this regard, particular attention has been given to the immediate aftermath of
the political upheavals of 1989.6 A question that spurred competing plans and visions
in the EC was how to engage and include Cold War neutrals in the building of the EU
3 Recent developments in the EU has been popularized in Luuk van Middelaar, The Passage to Europe:
How a Continent Became and Union (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 2013) and
in Luuk van Middelaar, Alarums & Excursions: Improvising Politics on the European Stage (Newcastle
upon Tyne: Agenda Publishing, 2019). A perspective stressing the significance of neoliberal ideas in the
post-Cold War transition of European states is found in Philipp Ther, Europe Since 1989: A History
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).
4 Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson, ‘Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the US Offer to Limit
NATO Expansion’, International Security 40, no. 4 (2016): 7–44; Mary Elise Sarotte, ‘A Broken
Promise? What the West Really Told Moscow about NATO Expansion’, Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5
(2014): 142–49; Mary Elise Sarotte, ‘Not One Inch Eastward? Bush, Baker, Kohl, Genscher, Gorbachev,
and the Origin of Russian Resentment toward NATO Enlargement in February 1990’, Diplomatic
History 34, no. 1 (2010): 119–40; Mary Elise Sarotte, ‘How to Enlarge NATO: The Debate inside the
Clinton Administration, 1993–95’, International Security 44, no. 1 (2019): 7–41; Mark Kramer, ‘The
Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia’, Washington Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2009): 39–61.
5 In 1848 “German history reached its turning-point and failed to turn”, A.J.P. Taylor wrote in The Course
of German History: A Survey of the Development of German History since 1815 (London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1945), 69.
6 Mary Elise Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2009); Frédéric Bozo, Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War, and German Unification
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2009).
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after 1989. A relatively well-studied case is the French President Francois Mitterrand’s
plan for a European confederation consisting of a consolidated Western European core
and a looser pan-European structure stretching to East.7 As it happened, Mitterrand’s
plans were abandoned in 1991, but in the first years of the 1990s various alternatives
were devised both in capitals like Paris and Bonn but also the European Commission,
as to how to include the former Eastern bloc countries into the EU project.8
The most pressing question for policymakers, however, was how to accommodate
the deepening of the EC/EU with its widening. Was it possible to expand the old
Community without diluting its purpose to create an ‘ever closer union among the
peoples of Europe’? Many of these plans took their cue from European Commission
President Jacques Delors’ musings of a Europe of ‘concentric circles’. According to
Delors, European nations would find their place in the integration process either at the
core, participating in the deepest levels of supranational integration, or the outer rings,
with various degree of detachment and more selective participation in the EU project.
Similar ideas were put forward by a team of advisors around West German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl in the summer of 1989.9 Even after the Maastricht summit and the
decision to open membership to countries fulfilling the necessary criteria, the idea of a
‘core Europe’ persisted. This was seen in the idea outlined in 1994 by German centre-
right politicians Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers for a ‘Kerneuropa’.10 In that same
year two advisors to Kohl, Michael Meters and Norbert J. Prill, called for a ‘Europe of
Olympic rings’ rather than one of concentric circles.11 And British Prime Minister John
7 Frédéric Bozo, ‘The Failure of a Grand Design: Mitterrand’s European Confederation, 1989–1991’,
Contemporary European History 17, no. 3 (2008): 391–412.
8 In addition to German designs for a quick, but territorially limited enlargement (Poland, Czech Republic
and Hungary), the Commissioner for Enlargement, Frans Andriessen (1989–1993), put forward his own
suggestion (the Andriessen Plan) and the French Prime Minister Édouard Balladur his own plan in 1993
(the Balladur Plan). Michael Gehler, ‘Revolutionäre Ereignisse und geoökonomisch-strategische
Ergebnisse. Die EU-und NATO- “Osterweiterungen” 1989–2015 im Vergleich’, ZEI Discussion Papers
no. 239 (2019), 13–16; Marcin Zaborowski, ‘Germany and EU Enlargement: From Rapprochement to
“Reaproachment?”’, in Helene Sjursen (ed.), Enlargement in Perspective (Oslo: Arena, 2005): 41–68;
Kristina Spohr, ‘Precluded of Precedent-Setting? The NATO Enlargement Question in the Triangular
Bonn-Washington-Moscow Diplomacy of 1990/1991 and Beyond’, Journal of Cold War Studies 14, no.
4 (2012): 4–54.
9 Michael Mertes and Norbert J. Prill, ‘Der verhängnisvolle Irrtum eines Entweder-Oder. Eine Vision für
Europa’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (19 July 1989).
10 Karl Lamers and Wolfgang Schäuble, ‘Überlegungen zur europäischen Politik’, CDU/CSU policy
brief, 1 September 1994, available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20160318173446/https://www.cducsu.de/upload/schaeublelamers94.pdf
(accessed 1 October 2019).
11 ‘Es wächst zusammen, was zusammengehören will. “Maastricht Zwei” muss die Europäische Union
flexibel Machen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (9 December 1994).
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Major was also well known to be an advocate of a rapidly enlarging but highly
differentiated union.
What they all had in mind was dubbed ‘differentiated integration’ and came to be
analysed in the 1990s in a surge of studies by political scientists and integration
theorists.12 The principles of ‘variable geometry’ and ‘multispeed Europe’, as two
different forms of differentiation, were even enshrined in the Treaty of Amsterdam in
1997 and the Treaty of Nice in 2001.13 Though the general premise was that the overall
direction should remain geared towards gradual deepening, this did not require all EU
nations to adopt wholly symmetrical positions or participate in the deepest forms of
integration either at the outset or with permanent opt-outs. This principle has been
followed through in a number of ways in today’s EU. Despite the prevalence of ideas
such as these during the post-Cold War transition, though, surprisingly little historical
research has been conducted on them. This chapter therefore aims to contribute to the
limited body of historical, archive-based works that exist on the question of
differentiated integration in the 1980s and 1990s. In line with the broader objectives of
this volume, which seeks to highlight other forms of integration, it asks more
specifically the extent to which ideas of multi-speed European unity were developed
into actual plans, attempted or implemented at the turn of the 1990s.
One of the principal forms of differentiated integration today is the European
Economic Area (EEA), which consists of the EU and three European Free Trade
Association (EFTA) members: Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. Following
negotiations in 1989-93, the EEA came into force in 1994. The agreement was devised
to provide EFTA countries – with the exception of Switzerland, which narrowly
rejected the agreement in a referendum in December 1992 – with access to the European
single market and its four freedoms. Significantly, it left these countries outside a
12 According to Alexander Stubb, the discussion of differentiated integration started with the Tindemans
Report in 1976, but then received scant attention until the CDU/CSU report by Lamers and Schäuble in
1994. Alexander Stubb, ‘A Categorization of Differentiated Integration’, Journal of Common Market
Studies 34, no. 2 (1996): 283–95. Scholarly interest in differentiated integration weakened in the 2000s,
but re-emerged in the 2010s as its policy relevance increased. See for instance Kenneth Dyson and
Angelos Sepos, Which Europe? The Politics of Differentiated Integration (Basingstoke and New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Dirk Leuffen, Berthold Rittberger and Frank Schimmelfennig,
Differentiated Integration: Explaining Variation in the European Union (Basingstoke and New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Benjamin Leruth and Christopher Lord, ‘Differentiated Integration in the
European Union: A Concept, a Process, a System or a Theory?’, Journal of European Public Policy 22,
no. 6 (2015): 754–63.
13 Alexander Stubb, Negotiating Flexibility in the European Union: Amsterdam, Nice and Beyond (New
York: Palgrave, 2002).
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number of supranational policy fields such as the EU’s customs union and the common
agricultural and fisheries policies. With its own institutional structures, the EEA
countries also stood outside the formal institutions and decision-making processes of
the EU. As a Finnish official, Paavo Kaarlehto, described the suggested arrangement
already in 1989, it meant something ‘less than membership and more than
association’.14 This is for good reason. For while they did not assume all the rights and
responsibilities of EU members, the EFTA countries were nonetheless bound to its legal
and institutional order in return for access to its single market. A two-pillar system of
supervision and judicial control was established, consisting of an EFTA Surveillance
Authority and an EFTA Court exercising judicial control of the agreement in the EFTA
countries, mirroring the roles of the European Commission and the Court of Justice of
the European Union (ECJ).
Despite the complexity of its institutional and legal design, the EEA has slowly
become a routine feature of the European institutional landscape. Since Sweden,
Austria and Finland – all former EFTA members – joined the EU, it has provided
Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein with continuous access to the EU’s market. Given
the limitations it places on the internal sovereignty of the EFTA countries in single
market-related legislation and the peculiarities of its legal oversight arrangements, the
EEA’s longevity in itself has become a topic for scholarly interest and has resulted in
several studies.15 Long a relatively little known aspect of European integration, the EEA
also became a topic of lively discussion after the referendum in the United Kingdom to
leave the EU in 2016. After the vote, various alternatives, including the so-called
‘Norway model’ – which in reality referred to accessing the EU market via the EEA –
were explored for the United Kingdom’s future relationship with Brussels.16
14 Cited in Mauno Koivisto, Witness to History: The Memoirs of Mauno Koivisto, President of Finland
1982–1994 (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), 224.
15 Halvard Haukeland Fredriksen, ‘Bridging the Widening Gap between the EU Treaties and the
Agreement on the European Economic Area’, European Law Journal 18, no. 6 (2012): 868–86; Halvard
Haukeland Fredriksen and Christian N.K. Franklin, ‘Of Pragmatism and Principles: The EEA Agreement
20 Years On’, Common Market Law Review 52, no. 3 (2015): 629–84; Tom O. Johnsen and Pernille
Rieker, ‘The EEA and Norway Grants: A Source of Soft Power?’, Journal of European Integration 37,
no. 4 (2015): 417–32. In 2012 the Norwegian government published an exhaustive study of the
functioning of the EEA treaty. For more see Norges Offentliga Utredningar, Utenfor og innenfor. Norges
avtaler med EU (Oslo: NOU, 2012). An earlier exercise with a similar task was carried out by Dag Harald
Claes and Bent Sofus Tranøy, Utenfor, annerledes og suveren? Norge under EØS-avtalen (Bergen:
Fagbokforlaget, 1999).
16 John Erik Fossum and Hans Petter Graver, Squaring the Circle of Brexit: Could the Norway Model
Work? (Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2018).
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The institutional setup, the legal order and the functioning of the EEA have all
been extensively covered in existing research.17 Comparatively less work has been done
on the actual negotiation process itself, however.18 This chapter charts the course of the
EEA negotiations from the beginning of the process in 1989 until 1994, when the EEA
came to force. It utilises materials stored in EFTA’s own archives, interviews and
declassified national archives where these have been made accessible.19 Taking
advantage of the possibility to reconstruct the negotiation process with access to
primary documentation on the EFTA side, the chapter looks at the critical junctures of
the negotiations and their course. What is of interest are the positions of the various
actors and the linkages of the EEA negotiations with the preparations of the EU’s 1995
enlargement. Placing it within a broader frame of the institutional development of
European integration at the time, it explores the EEA’s origins and founding principles,
and analyses how contemporary policymakers defined and saw its long term aims as
either a bridge or an alternative to a geographically expanded EU.
Besides showing how the EEA eventually took the shape it did, the chapter also
looks at the EEA’s structural weaknesses and how ultimately a realisation of its
17 Cédric Dupont, ‘The Failure of the Nest-Best Solution: EC-EFTA Institutional Relationships and the
European Economic Area’, in Vinod K. Aggarwal (ed.), Institutional Designs for a Complex World:
Bargaining, Linkages and Nesting (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1998): 124–60; Sieglinde
Gstöhl, ‘The Nordic Countries and the European Economic Area (EEA)’, in Lee Miles (ed.), The
European Union and the Nordic Countries (London: Routledge, 1996), 47–62; Sven Norberg, ‘The
Agreement on a European Economic Area’, Common Market Law Review 29, no. 6 (1992): 1171–98;
Leif Sevón, ‘The EEA Judicial System and the Supreme Courts of the EFTA States’, European Journal
of International Law 3, no. 2 (1992): 329–40; Armando Toledano Laredo, ‘The EEA Agreement: An
Overall View’, Common Market Law Review 29, no. 6 (1992): 1199–1213: Helen Wallace (ed.), The
Wider Western Europe: Reshaping the EC/EFTA Relationship (London: RIIA, 1991).
18 Eyewitnesses and contemporary actors have written a good part of the existing history. For instance
Eric Hayes, a European Commission official involved in the EEA negotiations, has covered his
experiences in ‘From Cold War to Common Currency. A Personal Perspective on Finland and the EU’,
Finnish Foreign Policy Papers 1 (2011): 19–22. Ulf Dinkelspiel, Sweden’s main negotiator, has covered
the negotiations in his memoirs Den motvillige europén. Sveriges väg till Europa (Stockholm: Atlantis,
2009). Paal J. Frisvold, from the Norwegian negotiating team, provides a brief account of the origins of
EEA in Towards Europe: The Story of Reluctant Norway (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2018), 93–98. The
Finnish perspective has been summarised by Päivi Luostarinen and Pertti Salolainen, who led the Finnish
negotiation team, in ‘Euroopan talousalue: kylmän sodan jaloista aidoksi eurooppalaiseksi toimijaksi’,
in Alexander Stubb (ed.), Marginaalista ytimeen. Suomi Euroopan unionissa 1989–2003 (Helsinki:
Tammi, 2006), 16–32. This author has covered the negotiations in the context of Finnish integration
policy in Juhana Aunesluoma, Vapaakaupan tiellä. Suomen kauppa- ja integraatiopolitiikka
maailmansodista EU-aikaan (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seuran Toimituksia, 2011), 410–32.
19 The author has had access to previously classified documents in EFTA archives in Geneva and in
foreign ministry archives and presidential papers in Finland, where a 25-year rule is applied to classified
government papers. At the time of writing, archival materials from the EC on the EEA have not yet been
made available. An interview with Eric Hayes, a Commission official responsible for EFTA affairs at the
time, has however provided welcome information. Future research will undoubtedly find EC
documentation on the origins of the EEA informative.
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institutional inadequacy paved the way for EU enlargement. The creation of the EEA
exemplified how difficult it was to give coherent institutional or legal form to any ideas
of a Europe of concentric or Olympic circles. Not surprisingly, the EEA has not been
adopted as a model for other non-members to arrange their access to the EU’s single
market. And despite some attention being given attention during Britain’s Brexit
debate, the EEA has not emerged as an attractive or a realistic alternative to free trade
agreements with the EU’s closest geographic partners. Yet the negotiations leading to
it are an important part in the history of European cooperation as a process distinct from
or something different to today’s EU, and its existence shows the multitude ways in
which non-EU countries planned and eventually arranged their positions in it in the
1990s.
Jacques Delors and the Idea of a ‘Third Way’
As the post-Second World War division of Europe came to its end, the institutional
architecture of European cooperation was changing rapidly. Whereas the countries of
the former Eastern bloc were in the early 1990s already focused on their political and
economic transition to the West and, as part of this, negotiated bilateral trade and
cooperation agreements with the EC, the economically advanced EFTA members had
a broader range of options to consider.
Prior to the signing of the SEA, the EFTA countries moved closer to the EC
through gradual, free trade integration. A significant milestone in closing their trade
policy gap was the bilateral free trade agreements between the EFTA countries and the
EC finalised in 1972.20 Addressing the need to access the EC markets following the
implementation of the common commercial policy and the common external tariffs of
the EC’s customs union, the 1972 agreements covered only industrially manufactured
goods. They came into force on the eve of the Community’s first enlargement when
Denmark and EFTA’s hitherto leading economic power, Britain, left the Association in
favour of the EC. Portugal, a member of EFTA since its creation in 1960, followed suit
in 1986. EFTA’s remaining members were, then, all small, advanced economies:
Sweden, Norway, Austria, Switzerland, Iceland, and Finland, which upgraded its
associate status in EFTA to full membership in 1986.
20 Finland’s free trade agreement with the EC came to force in 1973. See Tapani Paavonen,
Vapaakauppaintegraation kausi. Suomen suhde Länsi-Euroopan integraatioon FINN-EFTAsta EC-
vapaakauppaan (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, Historiallisia Tutkimuksia, 2008).
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Fuelled by growing cross border investments and trade, the economic integration
process between the members of EFTA and the EC accelerated in the 1980s. After an
EC-EFTA summit held in Luxembourg in April 1984, a declaration bearing the name
of the host country kicked off a procedure aiming to reduce remaining non-tariff
barriers to trade.21 The aim was to create a ‘European economic space’ through
incremental, step-by-step harmonisation of administrative practices, regulations and
laws governing economic activity in the EC-EFTA area. As the EFTA and EC
negotiators soon found out, the task was daunting. Even minor achievements to remove
obstacles of trade and commercial activity took months or more of painstaking, detailed
administrative work between the six EFTA countries, the EFTA Secretariat in Geneva
and the European Commission in Brussels.22 In comparison with the comprehensive
approach of the SEA, the so-called Luxembourg process looked a hopelessly dated
trade liberalisation mechanism better suited to the circumstances of earlier decades than
the 1980s.
Implied in the Luxembourg process however was that this new relationship would
go well beyond mere free trade integration. Economic integration in this sense was no
longer a matter of dismantling tariff-based or other traditional barriers to trade. Rather,
it now focused on deepening economic integration on a broad front. This implied
establishing the free movement of the factors of production, goods and services,
increasing capital and labour mobility, and harmonising industrial norms and
competition policy regulations. All this required synchronising of domestic legislation
and regulations in EFTA states, and called for more efficient intra-EFTA
coordination.23
21 The Luxembourg declaration highlighted the importance of ‘further actions to consolidate and
strengthen co-operation, with the aim of creating a dynamic European economic space of benefit to their
countries’. EFTA Archives, Geneva (hereafter EFTA-Geneva), EFTA Consultative Committee: CSC
Documents 1985–1987, EFTA/CSC 3/85, ‘Progress report on the follow-up of the Luxembourg
declaration, Note by the Secretariat’, 5 March 1985.
22 The EFTA Secretariat noted already a year after the declaration that ‘[t]he implementation is of
necessity a time-consuming process”. Progress report on the follow-up of the Luxembourg declaration,
Note by the Secretariat, 5 March 1985. In the following autumn concerns were raised in the EFTA
Consultative Committee about slow progress and “a lack of urgency” in the talks. EFTA-
Geneva/EFTA/CSC/13/85, ‘Consultative Committee 53rd Meeting Geneva 15 and 16 October 1985,
Report by the Chairman’, 25 October 1985.
23 The need for a unified approach on the EFTA side to deal with the implications of the SEA was stressed
in the EFTA Consultative Committee in October 1986: ‘EFTA should be used as a joint platform to
provide strength in negotiations with the Community’, see EFTA-Geneva/EFTA/CSC/ES/3/86,
EFTA/CSC 11/86 (Annex IV) ‘Consultative Committee 55th Meeting, Geneva 27 and 28 October 1986’,
26 November 1986.
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Business lobbying organisations exerted pressure on their national governments
to devise new institutional arrangements with the EC or to seek its full membership.
Foreign direct investments from the EFTA countries to the EC grew significantly in the
late 1980s, creating an outflow of capital and tensions within the business and political
elites in the EFTA countries. The Swedish government was most obviously nervous
about the situation, but concern was visible elsewhere.24 In the eyes of contemporary
observers, powerful structural forces – such as growing regionalism in global markets,
the EC’s internal consolidation and the lessening of the geopolitical tensions and the
roles of the United States and the Soviet Union in European affairs –all pushed the
EFTA countries towards the EC.25 By 1988-89 a wide expectation in expert circles was
that the EFTA countries would eventually find it hard to resist the pull from the EC to
join it as full members.26
The problem was that nobody knew how long this might take, or in what order
and when the EFTA countries might seek EC membership. The EC was still digesting
its Iberian enlargement from the mid-1980s. Furthermore, it had plenty on its plate
regarding its own internal affairs. After all, the autumn of 1989 brought to the fore the
question of German reunification and the repercussions of the overthrow of the pro-
Soviet regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. What heightened concerns in EFTA
member states were the messages emanating from the Commission that the EC was not
about to open its doors for another round of enlargement for quite some time. After the
implementation of the SEA began, the Community signalled that deepening of intra-
Community integration and the completion of the single market were its priorities, and
thus that there was no wish to open negotiations with potential new members.
Commission President Jacques Delors was well known for his critical views against
taking on new members, especially Cold War neutrals, lest their presence would hamper
the evolution of the Community towards a deeper political union. In his eyes, what
24 Raimo Väyrynen, ‘Finland and the European Community: Changing Elite Bargains’, Cooperation and
Conflict 28, no. 1 (1993): 31–46.
25 The implications of the SEA were clear from the start to EFTA in 1985: ‘Unless some initiatives are
forthcoming from the EFTA side for parallel developments, the EFTA countries would miss the bus as
regards participating in the creation of an benefiting from the European economic space’, Finland’s
Minister for Foreign Trade Jermu Laine pointed out as Chairman of the EFTA Consultative Committee
in its meeting in Geneva in October 1985. See EFTA-Geneva/EFTA/CSC/13/85, ‘Consultative
Committee 53rd Meeting Geneva 15 and 16 October 1985, Report by the Chairman’, 25 October 1985.
26 Susan Wilson, ‘Austria’s Application for Membership in the European Community and Delors’ Call
for A New EC-EFTA Relationship’, University of Georgia Journal of International and Comparative
Law 20, no. 1 (1990): 241–51.
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ought to come first was the SEA’s implementation and a revision of the basic treaties.
Nothing specific would therefore be said about possible enlargement before the existing
twelve EC member states had resolved their own future.
Thus, the EFTA countries found themselves on the horns of a dilemma. The
alternatives were either to seek a revision to the existing bilateral free trade agreements
between EFTA countries and the EC by incorporating at least some of the EC’s four
freedoms, or to negotiate some kind of multilateral EFTA-EC wide framework
agreement. Few knew however how these kinds of agreements would look or how they
could be governed given the unique legal order underpinning the EC’s single market.
Neither was it obvious prior to 1989 whether the EC would even be interested in such
arrangements.
Complicating matters for many EFTA states was that, as the implementation of
the SEA begun in earnest from 1988, it became clear that the EC was not enthusiastic
about continuing the Luxembourg process. Behind this lay the belief that the whole
scheme was out of step with the new thinking on the sort of comprehensive economic
liberalisation that had been embodied in the SEA. Suddenly, the only option that really
remained open to EFTA countries was full membership in the EC. And thanks both to
the stance of the EC and the domestic political circumstances of the EFTA states
themselves, this, of course, was a choice not yet on the table.
This made the search for an alternative approach all the more urgent. And it
likewise required EFTA members to work far more closely with one another. After the
1984 declaration that launched the Luxembourg process, EFTA states had in fact
already gradually strengthened their internal organisation and had started coordinating
their negotiating positions vis-à-vis the EC.27 Whereas the 1972 free trade agreements
had been a bilateral affair between individual EFTA members and the EC, the
Luxembourg process was the start of a multilateral approach, with a High-Level
Contact Group consisting of EFTA and EC representatives handling the process.28
However, instead of acting as a unified group towards the EC, the EFTA states also
continued to deal bilaterally with the European Commission. Besides obvious technical
27 The EFTA Secretariat stressed the need for a unified approach on the EFTA side to deal with the
implications of the SEA: ‘EFTA should be used as a joint platform to provide strength in negotiations
with the Community’. EFTA-Geneva/EFTA/CSC/11/86, EFTA/CSC/ES 3/86 (Annex IV), ‘Consultative
Committee 55th Meeting, Geneva 27 and 28 October 1986, 26 November 1986.
28 Ibid.
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difficulties, it proved hard to reach consensus on major negotiating items on the EFTA
side and the whole process was considered inadequate.29
It was in this context that Delors took the initiative in early 1989. In his inaugural
address to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 17 January 1989, he proposed
opening negotiations with EFTA on a so-called third road; that is, a new type of
comprehensive Western-European common market that would consist of both the EC
and EFTA. As with the SEA, Delors remarked, the aim of this would be to find a more
holistic approach than had been customary in previous rounds of trade liberalisation in
the EC or in GATT. In practice this meant that instead of an item-by-item or sector-by-
sector approach, there needed to be a reorganization of cross-border economic activity
in its entirety, supported by new institutional and legal structures. Referring to the
progress already made between the EC and EFTA, Delors stated that: ‘With each step
we take the slope is getting steeper. We are coming up to the point where the climber
wants to stop to get his breath, to check that he is going in the right direction and that
he is properly equipped to go on’. For him, there were two options going forward. First
was to ‘stick to our present relations, essentially bilateral, with the ultimate aim of
creating a free trade area encompassing the Community and EFTA’. Alternatively there
existed the chance to ‘look for a new, more structured partnership with common
decision-making and administrative institutions to make our activities more effective
and to highlight the political dimension of our cooperation in the economic, social,
financial and cultural spheres’.30 Should EFTA ‘strengthen its own structures’, Delors
continued, the options would change:
In that case the framework for cooperation would rest on the two pillars of our
organizations. If it did not, we would simply have a system based on Community
rules, which could be extended – in specific areas – to interested EFTA countries
and then perhaps, at some date in the future, to other European nations.31
And for the arrangement to work, EFTA countries would have to acknowledge that ‘the
single market forms a whole with its advantages and disadvantages, its possibilities and
29 Author interview with Veli Sundbäck (Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs), 17 October 2007.
30 Address given by Jacques Delors to the European Parliament 17 January 1989, Bulletin of the European




limitations’. There would be no picking and choosing, no optional menus, and members
of the wider single market would have to accept the principle of harmonisation of
national legislation. As Delors put it: ‘Are our partners willing to transpose the common
rules essential to the free movement of goods into their domestic law and, in
consequence, accept the supervision of the Court of Justice, which has demonstrated its
outstanding competence and impartiality?’32
The immediate reaction in EFTA to Delors’ proposal was mixed. In Austria, the
government was somewhat reserved since Delors seemed to have hardened his stance
against new membership bids. Delors, after all, used the same speech to state that
‘internal development takes priority over enlargement’.33 Similar concerns existed in
Norway, although Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland made clear from the
beginning that her government welcomed the opportunity to review EFTA’s relations
with the Community.34 The Swedes, aware that an opening of some kind from the
Commission was forthcoming, were nonetheless taken by surprise by the boldness of
Delors’ suggestion and the prominence of the EC-EFTA nexus within the speech. In
any case, the response in Stockholm was enthusiastic, and similar reactions came from
Iceland and Finland. As Sweden’s main negotiator to the EC, Ulf Dinkelspiel, put it,
the mood in Stockholm was that the proposed deepening of relations with the EC fitted
Swedish interests ‘like a hand in glove’.35
Despite initial misgivings in some quarters, on a general level the idea of
concentric circles and the widening of the single market with a comprehensive
agreement suited the EFTA countries quite well. According to Finnish President Mauno
Koivisto, ‘For us, the new situation was unexpected, but it was well suited to us’, not
only because the plan made economic sense but because it was particularly well suited
to the needs of neutral EFTA states. As the view of the Soviet Union still carried weight
in Finland, Delors’ ideas were attractive as they ‘did not mean that Finland needed to
deviate from its established and growing neutrality line.’36 As researcher Hanna Ojanen
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid; Dinkelspiel, Den motvillige europén, 119–21. Finland’s President, Mauno Koivisto, used stronger
language in his memoirs: ‘To Austria, and in particular to its foreign minister Alois Mock, who
represented the Christian Democratic People’s party, the speech of Delors came as a shock’. See
Koivisto, Witness to History, 224.
34 Dinkelspiel, Den motvillige europén, 119–21.
35 Ibid.
36 Koivisto, Witness to History, 225.
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later put it, it was as if Delors’ proposal for a ‘third way’ had been invented by Finns
themselves.37
Problematic however was how little thought had been given by either EFTA or
the EC to the practicalities of this sort of arrangement. As an official who at the time
handled the EC desk at the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Antti Kuosmanen,
described the situation at the end of 1988, EFTA officials in Geneva and the member
states had been aware that ideas regarding a new approach to EFTA-EC relations had
been aired in Brussels at a high level, but a general feeling was that they had been
abandoned.38 In the autumn of 1988, the Swedish government had drafted a model for
a possible bilateral Swedish-EC framework agreement for its own internal use, where
among other things the institutional questions had been discussed. As the crucial issue
would be how to secure at least some influence in the EC’s internal decision-making,
the Swedes had devised a solution where they would have a right to participate in the
preparatory stages of decision-making but would have no formal position in the EC’s
institutions. As a model for this, the Swedes had discovered the FINEFTA agreement
from 1961, where EFTA countries had made a separate agreement with Finland with
its own institutional structure to enable its participation in the Association’s activities.39
Similar work had been conducted in the EFTA Secretariat in Geneva, where officials
had sketched out ideas for broadening the single market but with the inclusion of a joint
EC-EFTA institution overseeing the whole structure.40
In the summer of 1988, Delors, in discussions with EFTA leaders and a speech
during a visit to Helsinki, had hinted that there would be an agreement that would
improve the conditions to access the EC’s markets.41 In the following autumn,
Commission officials had asked their EFTA counterparts that they would come up with
a proposal for a comprehensive solution, but this had not led to further discussions at
that time.42 In November 1988, Eric Hayes, a Commission official responsible for
EFTA affairs, explained his own private thinking to EFTA representatives about a
‘framework agreement’ to be negotiated between the EC and EFTA. What in Hayes’
37 Ojanen, ‘If in “Europe”, then in its “core”?’, 156.
38 Antti Kuosmanen, Finland’s Journey to the European Union (Maastricht: European Institute of Public
Administration, 2001), 5–6.
39 Dinkelspiel, Den motvillige europén, 116–18.
40 Author interview with Eric Hayes (EC Commission), 11 October 2018.
41 Author interview with Erik Forsman (Federation of Finnish Industries), 18 February 2010.
42 Kuosmanen, Finland’s Journey, 5–6.
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view was essential was that EFTA should take the initiative in the matter.43 As the
general feeling was that the ball was in EFTA’s court, a meeting of EFTA officials on
11 January 1989 revealed that few anticipated a move from the EC regarding the idea
of a new framework agreement. It was decided that the whole matter of a possible
framework agreement would not be made public and that internally the issue would be
considered ‘very confidential’ for the time being.44
Speculation was rife regarding Delors’ actual motivations. Was he merely trying
to forestall EFTA countries’ membership applications by creating a temporary stop-gap
measure? Or did his initiative reflect a more thought-through plan for the future
institutional architecture of European integration, consisting of the concentric circles
he had been talking about earlier, each with their own organisational structures and
legal arrangements? The overall consensus in EFTA capitals was that the EC was trying
to achieve two simultaneous goals. First, the aim indeed was to forestall the opening a
new enlargement round before deepening of cooperation among the twelve had taken
place. What the Commission in particular had in mind was a membership application
from Austria, but possibly also from Norway. According to Dinkelspiel, the second
motivation was to develop cooperation with EFTA ‘to strengthen Europe’s role in the
world’. This was in line with Delors’ thinking of a (Western) Europe of ‘concentric
circles, with EC countries as its core – though not necessarily all the twelve – who were
willing to proceed towards a federation’.45
As the talks eventually started, more clarity emerged on what the EC’s
motivations were. In November 1989, Commission officials gave their EFTA
counterparts several reasons why they had felt ‘compelled to establish more structured
links’. These are worth citing in full:
Firstly, the swifter pace of Community integration raised immediate questions
about our relations with our neighbours. Secondly, criticism by some EC Member
States and by certain social partners had confirmed that the case-by-case approach
43 Archives of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Helsinki (hereafter AFMFA), Telegram Geneva-
Helsinki, ‘Efta–EC-yhteistyö; EC-komission ajatuksia puitesopimuksen tekemisestä’, 1 December 1988.
44 AFMFA, Memorandum by Veli Sundbäck, ‘Efta-EC; Mahdollinen uusi puitejärjestely’, 11 January
1989. From their direct personal contacts to Delors it appears that both the Swedish premier Ingvar
Carlson and Norway’s premier Gro Harlem Brundtland expected Delors to use his inaugural speech in
Strasbourg as an occasion to propose a new approach, but had no knowledge of what its details might be.
Dinkelspiel, Den motvillige europén, 118–19; Hayes, From Cold War to Common Currency, 20, n.43.
45 Dinkelspiel, Den motvillige europén, 120–21.
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was too piecemeal and that a more comprehensive approach was necessary.
Accession applications were a third factor. Austria, Turkey and others would soon
be knocking at the door. Fourthly, the events in the Eastern bloc. Fifthly, and
perhaps most importantly, bureaucrats and politicians sometimes lagged behind
political realities; the political reality in this case was that they had an 18- or 19-
member market and needed to adopt a modern approach taking account of this.46
While it is obvious from this that there were several background factors on the EC side
motivating its approach, we should be careful overemphasising the EC’s need to avoid
new membership applications.47 Indeed, it seems clear from the available evidence that
what Delors had in mind was not merely to use the EEA as a tactical ploy to prevent or
slow down possible membership applications from EFTA countries. As Eric Hayes has
said, the Commission would have had no trouble in dealing with new membership
applications; so too did it have all the administrative requirements to prevent any
membership bid progressing until the EC was ready.48 Delors’ proposal thus more likely
reflected a profound sense that Europe’s whole institutional architecture would soon
need to be rethought and a new overarching structure was required to arbitrate with
those countries orbiting the EC.
Delors’ view, then, was strategic, and the EEA for him represented a key building
block for a future where ‘the European Community would form the core or a hub, and
there would be different arrangements for the other, peripheral countries’.49 The
characteristics of this sort of broader structure were clarified in an internal EFTA
memorandum later in the autumn:
the ‘inner circle’ would be constituted by the 12 Community Member States
aiming to reach economic and political union. The next circle would be
constituted by the countries making up the EES [European Economic Space, the
original name of the EEA] ensuring free movement of goods, capital, services
and persons, accompanied by cooperation in other fields between the EC and the
46 EFTA-Geneva/EFTA/CSC/INF/20/90 ‘19th Joint Meeting of the Delegations representing The
Economic and Social Committee of the EC and the EFTA Consultative Committee held in Paris on 27/28
November 1989. Act of Proceedings’, 11 May 1990.
47 Hayes, From Cold War to Common Currency, 19.
48 Author interview with Eric Hayes, 11 October 2918.
49 Ibid; Hayes, From Cold War to Common Currency, 19–20.
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EFTA countries. Individual Eastern countries which have succeeded in their
reforms could then become part of that circle or form a wider one. 50
What Delors, who had sounded out his ideas in the EC capitals in advance, had
in mind was a permanent solution to the dilemma caused by the conflicting demands of
deepening the Community with the widening of its geographic scope. The answer lay
in finding an alternative that allowed for the single market to be extended to EU
members and non-members alike. Eventually, the Community would likely accept new
members who fulfilled the necessary criteria into their fold but the EEA proposal
appeared to indicate that Brussels was not prepared to enlarge at the detriment of its
internal cohesion. And it also assumed that Cold War Western European neutrals might
not be the first to join this enlarged EC. According to West Germany’s then Foreign
Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, it was feasible that those ex-Soviet bloc countries
transitioning towards democracy and a market economy were better candidates to join
the EC since membership would strengthen this development. Poland and Hungary,
rather than Austria or Sweden, thus for a time looked more certain to accede.51
Hopes and Cracks in the EFTA Camp
Despite the opening of talks between EFTA and the EC, there was little indication that
the two sides would proceed with haste. A formal response from the EFTA side to
Delors’ proposal had emerged from an EFTA ministerial meeting in Oslo in March.
This sanctioned preparations for more formal negotiations to begin, which in turn were
initiated on the official level in Brussels in June 1989. Besides agreeing that the scope
of the negotiations was likely to be wide, however, views differed about what the end
result should be. Delors, for his part, was keen to agree on a statement of principle in
favour of an EFTA-EC structure. But there was no consensus about what this meant in
practice.52 While Finland, Iceland and Norway appeared happy with pursuing a more
pragmatic, undefined approach, the Swiss government were decidedly cool to the idea.
Having been aware of what Delors had previously said about the necessity of accepting
50 EFTA-Geneva/EFTA/CSC/W/12/89, ‘Consultative Committee 62nd Meeting, Geneva, 16 and 17
October 1989 and 19th Joint Meeting with the Economic and Social Committee: The development of
EFTA-EC relations and the particular role of the EFTA Consultative Committee and the Economic and
Social Committee of the EC. Discussion paper by Mr. K. Sandegren’, 10 October 1989.
51 Ibid.
52 Hayes, From Cold War to Common Currency, 20.
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the evolving acquis communautaire as the foundation of the arrangement, Berne
foresaw serious difficulties in going along with an ill-defined process that could wind
up with it being forced to accept unfavourable policies and institutional arrangements.
Complicating matters further, Sweden, supported by Austria, indicated early on that the
goal should be to join the EC’s customs union rather than simply the single market.
This, though, would require closer alignment with the core political purpose of the EC
of the sort that neither Finland nor Switzerland was willing to accept. Eventually, as the
negotiations began in early 1990, this demand was dropped and the goal was set to
participate in the EC’s single market programme only.53
Given these initial difficulties, progress in the negotiations was surprisingly rapid
– even if it did take a while for the Commission to put together its negotiating team and
thereafter determine the part of the acquis which was relevant to the EEA.54 From the
start, it was envisaged that the agreement ought to enter into force at the same time as
the full implementation of the EC’s single market programme due at the beginning of
1993. The principle was to apply EC legislation in various categories with immediate
effect and to deal with any problems in a transitional period. The point of departure was
that the EEA agreement was to become an instrument that easily transposed relevant
EC legislation into EFTA countries’ national legislation. Likewise from the off, the
Commission made it clear that there could be very few exceptions to adopting EC
legislation in the EEA. The so-called negotiating mandate mainly concerned formal
derogations and transitional periods in the single market. As the substantive matters
mostly concerned the trade of goods and were already familiar from the Luxembourg
process, the negotiations proceeded surprisingly smoothly from one area of single
market-related legislation to another. What the negotiators found, somewhat to their
surprise, was how far their economies and regulatory frameworks had already
converged during the preceding years of free trade integration and global trade
liberalisation. The comprehensive approach, mirroring the principles of the SEA,
worked unexpectedly well, although the broad range of issues meant long hours for the
negotiators and their assisting staff in order to shift through an almost unfathomably
large corpus of Community law. As the EFTA countries were all highly developed,
open economies with a liberal trade policy outlook, the EEA agreement focused largely
53 EFTA-Geneva/Ministerial Meetings Working Papers 1989–1990/CS/29/90, ‘Informal EFTA
ministerial meeting, Geneva, 3 April 1990’, 30 April 1990.
54 Ibid.
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on how they would operate within, rather than adapt to, the single market. The bulk of
the agreement was hence negotiated with speed during the course of 1990, and finishing
touches were given to it in the first half of 1991.
This, it would soon prove, was the relatively easy part. For problems arose on the
EFTA side regarding its own capacity to deliver the institutional stability and efficiency
to run the EEA. As EFTA’s internal divisions and occasional clashes between the
member states were well known, the Commission stressed that EFTA as an organisation
would need to strengthen itself internally in order to shoulder its share of the burden of
the practical operative work. However, what would happen if any one of its members
decided to change course and seek for full EC membership? What would that do to the
internal cohesion of the Association, and how much of a voice could a fracturing and
diminishing EFTA have in its future dealings with an expanding Community, if its
members started to jump ship?55
As the preparations for the opening of the negotiations at the official level
commenced over the summer of 1989, it was thus not unexpected that the EEA talks
would encounter some sort of hitch. This happened most spectacularly when, breaking
ranks with its partners, Austria submitted its membership application to the EC in July
1989.56 Austria’s move came as no surprise, as it had already earlier indicated its
willingness to explore opportunities to join the EC while maintaining its permanent
neutrality. It was in a joint meeting of the EFTA Council and the EC ministerial
conference in Tampere, Finland, in June 1988, that Austria’s Foreign Minister Alois
Mock informed his EFTA counterparts of his government’s intentions. According to a
Finnish official present in the meeting, Mock’s announcement ‘spoiled the celebratory
mood of some of his colleagues’, as the other participants had entertained hopes for
strengthening the internal cohesion of EFTA before a long-awaited opening of new
talks with the EC.57 And certainly the prospect that one, and perhaps even several,
EFTA members might be changing course in their integration policy while the EEA
negotiations were still underway, did increase tensions. As the thinking went, if EFTA
was to secure its influence in the suggested ‘common decision-making and
administrative institutions’, it would have to be strengthened institutionally and learn
to speak with one voice. But the Austrian move appeared to do little more than show
55 Author interview with Veli Sundbäck (Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs), 17 October 2007.
56 Gehler, ‘A Newcomer Experienced in European Integration’, 137–39.
57 Kuosmanen, Finland’s Journey, 5.
20
the EEA to be a mere bridge to full EC membership. Perhaps worse still, it seemed to
indicate a preference for EFTA states to deal with the Community bilaterally rather than
multilaterally. Hopes for enhanced intra-EFTA cooperation thus faded.
It did admittedly help that Austria’s application did not meet with an immediate
response from the EC. This ensured that the pace of the EEA talks was not seriously
interrupted. But the question of EFTA’s internal cohesion was again thrown into doubt
when in October 1990 the Swedish government announced that it too planned to seek
full EC membership. The manner of this announcement was in fact arguably more fatal
for EFTA unity than Mock’s earlier announcement. For unlike Austria, Sweden’s
decision to launch a membership bid took its partners in EFTA by complete surprise.
Coming at a sensitive moment in the EEA negotiations, the Swedish government was
thus forced to expend significant energy reassuring its EFTA colleagues that it was still
committed to the EEA concept.58 Unavoidably, though, the momentum for a more
institutionally ambitious agreement began to weaken. The cracks in the EFTA camp
increasingly suggested that, far from becoming a permanent feature in the European
institutional landscape, the EEA would simply serve as a waiting room for countries on
their way to joining the Community in full.
These internal squabbles paled into relative insignificance however when
compared to the challenge caused by the Commission’s outlining of the EC agenda in
1990. First, since the concept of the single market needed to be adopted as a whole, it
was deemed necessary that the relatively wealthy EFTA economies would have to
contribute to the Community’s cohesion funds. Second, Switzerland and Austria would
have to open their borders for transit traffic through the Alps. Third, Norway and
Iceland, while not part of the common fisheries policy, would be obliged to allocate
fishing quotas to EC countries. Fourth, capital movements would have to be ‘liberalized
completely’, which Switzerland, among others, had difficulties in accepting from the
outset.59 EFTA, for its part, put its own demands on the table regarding decision-
making. As the talks opened, they were ‘concerned that the question of full participation
in the decision-shaping and decision-making process, as proposed so far by the
Commission, would not lead to a satisfactory solution for the EFTA countries’. If
58 EFTA-Geneva/HLNG Documents, ‘Annex II to HLNG 34/90’, 19 October 1990, and EFTA Working
Documents/EFTA/NG/V4/90, ‘Note on Comitology’, 11 October 1990.
59 EFTA-Geneva/EFTA/CSC/INF/20/90, ‘19th Joint Meeting of the Delegations representing The
Economic and Social Committee of the EC and the EFTA Consultative Committee held in Paris on 27/28
November 1989. Act of Proceedings’, 11 May 1990.
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special care was not taken to ‘ensure that the agreement would have an evolutionary
character’, it might ‘at worst […] mean their satellization’. As the EFTA Consultative
Committee – the body in EFTA comprising trade unions and business organisations –
put it in a report in October 1989, ‘it was not enough that the EFTA countries had to
take over the hard core of the acquis communautaire, they also needed to have a say in
its further development, as it was hardly likely that the train of integration would stop
where it stood at the end of 1992’.60
From what they had heard in 1989 and early 1990, the EFTA negotiators were
hopeful that the Community would indeed be interested in creating the ‘common
decision-making and administrative institutions’ Delors had spoken so warmly about in
his Strasbourg speech. Even in spring 1990, the feeling on the EFTA side was that the
Community would eventually modify its rigid stance and seek to build an overarching
body covering the whole structure. As EFTA’s Secretary-General Georg Reisch made
clear, the Association’s members were sure that ‘result [i.e. the EEA agreement] must
be a balance of rights and obligations. There will of course be exceptions. Exceptions
are not unknown to members of the European Community themselves.’61 The EFTA
countries understood full well that by adopting the acquis they would have to ‘accept
policies which they themselves had no part in the design of’. But for future legislation
certain to affect the countries of EFTA and the EC alike, ‘EFTA would insist on
discussing the question jointly. A partnership of the kind would mean that the views of
both the EFTA and the Community countries are fully taken into account when
legislation is [e]nvisaged’.62
With Delors himself leading the way, the Commission disappointed the EFTA
negotiators by hardening its positions even further during the course of 1990. As Delors
said in April, ultimately there would be no place for EFTA in EC decision-making.
Referring to the easier items in the negotiations regarding EFTA’s market access, and
also making clear that no economic benefits would be forthcoming unless the
institutional questions were settled, Commission officials stressed that ‘the economic
60 EFTA-Geneva/EFTA/CSC/18/89, ‘Consultative Committee, 62nd Meeting, Geneva, 16 and 17
October 1989. Report by the Chairman’, 2 November 1989.
61 EFTA-Geneva/EFTA/CSC/INF 20/90, ‘19th Joint Meeting of the Delegations representing The
Economic and Social Committee of the EC and the EFTA Consultative Committee held in Paris on 27/28
November 1989. Act of Proceedings’, 11 May 1990.
62 Ibid.
22
content and the legal institutional aspect were closely linked, and that they would need
to preserve the autonomy of EC decision-making.’63
In the spring of 1990, the EFTA negotiators subsequently came up with the idea
of a two-pillar structure, where the implementation and application of EEA rules would
be divided between the EC Commission and a new surveillance authority, with the two
bodies linked through a joint organisation at the EEA level.64 But while this promised
that the EEA ‘agreement remained an intergovernmental agreement without
supranational characteristic’65, it did not address the question of decision-making in the
way the EFTA side had hoped. In further discussions during autumn 1990 a pragmatic
solution was put forward by the EFTA side on ‘comitology’ – that is, decision-making.
Since ‘a solution which would put the EFTA States in front of a fait accompli will never
be accepted’, an alternative was proposed premised on ‘regular co-operation between
those at the national level who are responsible for putting the agreement into practice’.
This in effect would give EFTA countries the right to participate at the preparatory
phase of EU legislation if it were relevant to the EEA as a whole. And it would have
the advantage, if not in practice then in principle, that ‘neither side’ would be seen to
be ‘interfering with the decision-making autonomy’ of the other.66
A Successful Treaty?
How to approach the institutional conundrum divided EFTA countries until the end of
the negotiations in autumn 1991, with the Swiss adopting the most critical position. In
communications with other EFTA capitals in March and April 1991, the Swiss
delegates informed them that it would be unlikely they could accept the mere
consultative status of the EFTA countries in comitology as suggested by the
negotiators.67 In the end, after painstaking negotiations, the Swiss yielded and the
institutional questions were settled in October 1991. For EEA decision-making and
63 Ibid.
64 EFTA-Geneva/Ministerial Meetings Working Papers 1989–1990/CS/29/90, ‘Informal EFTA
ministerial meeting, Geneva, 3 April 1990’, 30 April 1990; EFTA-GENEVA/HLNG Documents/34/90,
‘EFTA-EC negotiating group V on legal and institutional questions, Brussels, 11 October 1990’, 19
October 1990 and ‘Report by Chairman; Annex I to HLNG 34/90’, 19 October 1990; Working
Documents/EFTA/NG/V/2/90, ‘Note on Surveillance’, 11 October 1990.
65 Fossum and Graver, Squaring the Circle of Brexit, 46.
66 EFTA-Geneva/EFTA Working Documents/EFTA/NG V4/90,  ‘Annex II to HLNG 34/90’, 19 October
1990 ‘Note on Comitology’, 11 October 1990,
67 EFTA-Geneva/Ministerial Meetings Working Papers 1990–1991/CS/15/91, ‘Informal EFTA
ministerial meeting, Geneva, 1 March 1991’, 12 April 1991.
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application of the agreement, a separate Council of Ministers was set up whose task
was to draw general policy lines and discuss possible modifications of the agreement.
Decision-making was based on a consensus where the EFTA countries would first need
to coordinate their own position and present their opinion with one voice. As the main
operative institution, an EEA Joint Committee was set up under the auspices of the
Council to oversee the practical implementation of the agreement and to resolve
possible problems. Like the Council, it also acted on the consensus principle. In addition
to these, a separate joint EEA Parliamentary Committee and an EEA Consultative
Committee for Economic and Social Affairs were set up. Participation in the
preparation of new EU legislation was resolved by requiring the Commission to consult
EFTA experts in the same way as experts were consulted in EU countries. The EFTA
countries were also granted limited access to the preparatory and implementing
committees of EU legislation. And the EFTA states would establish their own oversight
body, the EEA Surveillance Authority, which mirrored the role of the Commission.
Most significantly, the original agreement included a common EEA Court, which
would act as a court of first instance to resolve disputes arising from the EEA
agreement. The ECJ rejected this in December 1991, as it held that this was contrary to
the Treaty of Rome and the EJC’s position as the ultimate adjudicator of Community
law.68 It was subsequently replaced with an independent EFTA Court whose powers
were limited to the application of the EEA agreement to EFTA members. After
resolving the institutional and legal issues, there were still a number of difficult
questions left: fish, transit traffic and the cohesion fund contributions all required
agreement. Norway and Iceland had bilateral negotiations with the Commission on
fishing rights, as did Switzerland and Austria on transit traffic. Fishing was the most
problematic in the last phase. Finally, a solution was found that certain fish products in
the EFTA countries were completely free to enter the EC market and tariff concessions
were negotiated with some other products. Norway and Iceland, on the other hand,
granted the Community the fishing rights they had requested in their waters.
Why were the remaining issues, which had appeared so intractable earlier,
resolved in 1991? In the first half of 1991 a general pessimism existed that the EEA
would not be realised, given the differences of opinion both within EFTA members and
68 EFTA-Geneva/EFTA/CSC/INF/58/91, ‘ECJ Opinion’, 16 December 1991; Consultative Committee
Documents, ‘Opinion of the European Court of Justice on the EEA Agreement. Note by the Secretariat’,
19 December 1991.
24
between the negotiators on institutional questions. However, during the last months of
the negotiations, during the summer and autumn of 1991, a stronger political will
emerged which provided the impetus to see the negotiations to their successful end.
Even the recalcitrant Swiss negotiators were ultimately willing to swallow the final
agreement, and the overriding benefits of having a less than satisfactory agreement in
place seems to have been a motivating factor in this regard.
This same strand of thought appears to have influenced the willingness on all
sides to reach a compromise and close the negotiations. With the EC’s Maastricht
summit approaching, and with it the prospect of the Community’s post-Cold War
enlargement, the function of the EEA had changed. For the majority of EFTA members,
the EEA was no longer to be a permanent fixture in their integration strategies, but a
temporary solution allowing smooth access to the single market while they waited for
their entry into the Community as full members. The result was a far cry from the
expectations regarding an institutionally coherent and strong grouping of concentric
circles that had been envisaged just two years earlier. On the other hand, this fact helped
make the EEA easier to accept, flaws and all. In institutional questions, EFTA members
gave way on too many of the Community’s demands; the Community, in turn, gave
way bilaterally to individual EFTA countries on the sensitive questions of cohesion
fund contributions, fish quotas and transit traffic.
Despite the grand compromises achieved in 1991 and early 1992, the stony road
to the EEA was not yet complete. One more surprise was to come in the ratification
phase. The agreement was planned to come into force from the beginning of 1993, but
it was rejected in a referendum in Switzerland on 6 December 1992. This led to a need
to reopen the agreement regarding Swiss cohesion fund payments, the result of which
was that the EFTA countries were made to pick up the slack. With this sorted, on 1
January 1994, the EEA agreement finally entered into force, one year later than the
original schedule. It brought 12 EU countries and five EFTA countries – Finland,
Sweden, Austria, Norway and Iceland – together, while Liechtenstein would join when
it acceded to EFTA in 1995.
In the end there was very little left of the original ambition to create an
institutionally robust, overarching structure that could manage the varying speeds and
degrees of integration among certain European states surrounding the EC core. As
Robert Pelletier, a French industry representative in the EC’s Economic and Social
Committee, said about the whole exercise in February 1992, ‘many problems had been
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avoided rather than solved’. On a more positive note, Finland’s Ambassador to the EC,
Erkki Liikanen, speculated that the EEA might nevertheless ‘become a durable part of
the architecture of Europe for those countries which did not wish EC membership’.69
Looking back on events over the last two decades, this was highly prescient. For with
both the eventual refusal of the Norwegian electorate to accept the country’s accession
into the EU in 1994 and Iceland and Liechtenstein remaining as its other members, the
EEA by force of circumstance has indeed become a permanent feature of European
cooperation. While not reaching the lofty aspirations of its initiators, it was nevertheless
thought of as, and has in some form remained, an alternative to the strict supranational
framework of today’s EU. It was the Commission’s Eric Hayes who in 1992 spoke of
how ‘the EEA is undoubtedly important even though it is not what it was originally
intended to be’.70 Tracing the history of its development reminds us not only of how
and why this is the case, but also that integration ‘by other means’ has been something
the institutions and members of the EU, as much as the countries outside it, have long
wrestled with. What was preconceived as everlasting in 1989, in the course of the
negotiations gained a temporary character, but then after a number of twists and turns
became permanent, an outcome that many had wished for, but no one planned to happen
in the way it did.
69 EFTA-Geneva/EFTA/CSC/INF/9/92, ‘23rd Joint Meeting of the delegations representing the
Economic and Social Committee of the EC and the EFTA Consultative Committee held in the Hague on
20 November 1991. Record of proceedings’, 10 February 1992.
70 EFTA-Geneva/EFTA/CSC/INF 25/92, ‘24th Joint meeting between delegations of the Economic and
Social Committee of the EC and the EFTA Consultative Committee, Reykjavik, 19 May 1992. Report
by the EFTA Secretariat’, 23 June 1992.
